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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND
"FACTUAL CORRESPONDENCE" IN NEW MEXICO: THE
TENSION BETWEEN FORMALISM AND LEGAL REALISM
SAMANTHA ADAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a provocative opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently applied the
doctrine of qualified immunity in Garcia-Montoya vs. State of New Mexico State
Treasurer'sOffice.' The court-derived doctrine permits a government official, who
has violated a person's constitutional rights, to escape liability if his conduct was
objectively reasonable in light of existing law.2 The doctrine preserves the common
law practice of protecting officials from "undue interference with their duties
and.. .potentially disabling threats of liability."3
The policy underlying the doctrine of qualified immunity for elected officials
starkly conflicts with the policy underlying Section 19834 remedies for
constitutional violations.' Section 1983 is remedial legislation intended to
compensate those citizens whose civil rights have been violated by government
officials.6 Justice Brennan articulated the objectives of the Section 1983 enactment
in his opinion, Owen v. City of Independence. Citing prior Supreme Court
decisions, Justice Brennan wrote, "The central aim of the Civil Rights Act was to
provide protection to those persons wronged by the '[misuse] of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with
the authority of state law.'"8 Such an aim contradicts the goal of shielding elected
officials from unqualified liability; consequently, the courts conduct a balancing test
to determine whether the need for protecting government officials' ability to
perform their duties outweighs the importance of protecting people's constitutional
rights.9

The balancing test is embodied in the doctrine of qualified immunity.'0 If an

official's conduct is objectively reasonable in light of existing law, he is immune

* Class of 2003, University of New Mexico School of Law. Many thanks to Professor Ruth Kovnat and
Bryan Davis for their editing and input on this Casenote. Thanks also to Julie Sakura for resurrecting both her
English-teacher and coffee-drinking skills in her grand effort to help me be a better writer. Finally, thanks to
Madison, my five-year-old, for putting up with all of "mommy's lawyer stuff."
1. 2001-NMSC-003, - N.M.-, 16 P.3d 1084.
2. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that "government officials performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
3. Id. at 806.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any fights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
5. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 649-51 (1980).
6. Id.
7. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
8. Id. at 650 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961)).
9. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 (1987).
10. Id.
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from the liability of Section 1983."1 If the official's conduct is not objectively
reasonable in light of existing law, however, he is subject to Section 1983 liability. 2
The dispositive inquiry, then, considers what is "existing law." The Supreme Court
instructs that existing law is comprised of the particular factual scenarios that have
been resolved in precedent cases. 13 Thus, defining objectively reasonable conduct
requires strict analogy between the factual circumstances in the case at bar with
those in precedent cases.' 4 Outcomes, however, will vary depending upon whether
the court applies a formalist or realist approach. 5
Garcia-Montoya stands for the proposition that the "factual correspondence"
between a plaintiff s circumstances and precedent circumstances must be so similar
that the force of Section 1983 remedies is substantially weakened. In that opinion,
the New Mexico Supreme Court found that the State Treasurer, an elected official,
clearly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights to freedom of speech and political
association when he transferred her from her position as director of administrative
services to a "newly created" post.'6 Nonetheless, the court held that at the time of
the violation, case law did not support a finding that the elected official should have
known the transfer was unconstitutional. 7 Therefore, the State Treasurer was
entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, the plaintiff was deprived of her
Section 1983 remedies and the State Treasurer escaped legal responsibility for his
impermissible conduct.'"
Although the doctrine of qualified immunity is intended to protect government
officials from frivolous claims and interference with duties, its misapplication
threatens one of our most basic democratic values-that constitutional rights should
be protected, and if they are violated, victims should be compensated. By
immunizing such a broad swath of behavior, Garcia-Montoya shifts the balance
between these policies in favor of protecting public officials. More significantly, it
discourages officials from vigilantly researching and understanding whether their
actions are unconstitutional.
This Casenote first details the evolution of qualified immunity in the state of New
Mexico and explains the controversy surrounding its application. Second, it
examines the court's reasoning in Garcia-Montoyaand illustrates how the doctrine
was misapplied. Finally, this Casenote explains how the court's misapplication
exposes its formalist and overly-selective approach to qualified immunity analyses.
11.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
12. Id. (stating that "[ilf the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since
a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct").
13. Id.
14. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
15. See generallyElizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, SCHOLARLY WRITING FOR LAW STUDENTS 22-24 (1995)
(discussing the idea that
[f[ormalists see law as a set of fixed general principles from which conclusions as to specific
cases can be deduced. For a formalist judge, adjudication is largely a matter of deriving the
appropriate rule from precedent and applying it without regard to morality or public
policy... Legal realists see law and adjudication in social, political, historical, and economic
contexts. Legal Realist judges tend to be willing to consider empirical evidence as well as
precedent and often reach conclusions by balancing the equities.)
16. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003 4, __ N.M. at _, 16 P.3d at 1087.
N.M. at -, 16 P.3d at 1093.
17. Id. 26,
18. Id.

Summer 2002]

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

H. BACKGROUND
Statute 42 U.S.C. § 1983 establishes a cause of action for civil damages when
state officials violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.' 9 Victims are
permitted to sue officials directly for alleged transgressions.20 The Supreme Court
developed the doctrine of qualified immunity as a compromise between common
law absolute immunity for government officials and absolute liability for
constitutional violations imposed by Section 1983.2' The doctrine holds that officials
are liable only in circumstances where they have violated "clearly established
law., 22 Because governmental immunity is firmly rooted in the common law
tradition, a plaintiff bears the burden of showing the official violated a right he
should have known about and, thus, is not entitled to immunity.23
In meeting this burden, the plaintiff's most difficult hurdle is defining the violated
"right." Harlow held that defining a right requires a plaintiff to persuade the court
that the elected official's actions were objectively unreasonable in light of "clearly
established law. '2 1 "Clearly established law" is necessarily bound up in the factual
context of precedent. The established law may apply narrowly only to official
conduct closely similar to the facts in precedent cases, or more broadly to generally
analogous behavior. It is the courts' charge to determine the scope.25
The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton attempted to clarify the "clearly
established law" standard. The Court concluded that the "contours of the [victim's]
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand.. .what
he is doing violates the right., 26 Simply stated, if the official's conduct represents
conduct that has previously been deemed unconstitutional, then there is "clearly
established law." Thus, the official is not immune. The Court goes on, however, to
hold that this standard does not require that precisely the same set of facts exist.27
The official's conduct must merely approximate conduct that has previously been
examined.28

19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
20. Id.
21. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
22. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
23. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 642.
24. Harlow,457 U.S. at 818-19; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645 (holding that objective reasonableness
is the critical consideration and the official's subjective belief about his action is irrelevant).
25. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
26. See id. at 640.
27. See id.
28. Id.
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New Mexico adopted this analysis of qualified immunity in 1994.29 Relying on
Harlowand Anderson, the court outlined its own interpretation of the test.3 In order
for a public official to be protected by qualified immunity, two issues must be
resolved: (1) whether the alleged conduct violated a constitutional right that was
clearly established at that time and (2) whether it was objectively reasonable for the
official to believe his conduct was lawful." The objectively reasonable standard
requires the court to determine the degree of "factual correspondence" between the
conduct considered in the precedent cases and the conduct in the case at bar.32 If
there is no reasonable nexus between the case at hand and the precedent facts, the
official is immune. If the "factual correspondence" does support a logical analogy
between the cases, however, qualified immunity does not apply.33 Most
significantly, the New Mexico Supreme Court adopted the Supreme Court's holding
in Anderson that the facts do not have to be exactly the same. 4 The official's
conduct must merely approximate conduct that has previously been held
unconstitutional. 5
In 2000, New Mexico courts again had the opportunity to consider qualified
immunity in Kennedy v. Dexter ConsolidatedSchools.36 The court of appeals found
that precedent facts were not significantly analogous to the facts in question. Thus,
there was no factual correspondence and the official was immune. Although courts
have previously found it unconstitutional to strip-search students without suspicion
of individual wrongdoing,37 the appellate court did not find a sufficient analogy
where school officials required a student to strip down to his undergarments during
a general theft investigation.38 The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed this
decision concluding that "[a] strip search that ended with the otherwise naked
student still clinging to his underpants" did violate the student's clearly established
rights39 and "[w]hile forcing the exposure of a child's genitals is more invasive than
forcing the exposure of a child's chest, midriff, thighs, and underwear, we cannot
29. Oldfield v. Benavidez, 116 N.M. 785, 867 P.2d 1167 (1994) (holding that because qualified immunity
is a federal doctrine, state courts must apply federal interpretations); see Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990)
(holding that state courts must apply immunities as developed by federal courts in Section 1983 cases); see also
Richard B. Saphire, Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases and the Role of State Decisional Law, 35 ARIz. L.
REV. 3, 622-23 n.7 (1993) (discussing that "[n]ormal principles of stare decisis would require that the dispositive
decisions of the forum circuit would bind the district court notwithstanding the conflicting decisions of other federal
circuit and district courts"). See, e.g., Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1990)
("For a right to be clearly established, it is sufficient if decisions of the Supreme Court or of the
appropriate circuit have defined the contours of the right with reasonable specificity.... [wihere
the forum circuit's decisions are relevant to, but not dispositive of, the qualified immunity
question, the district court must decide what weight, if any, it should accord to the decisions of
the other circuits.").
30. Oldfield, 116 N.M. at 790, 867 P.2d at 1172.
31. See id.
32. Garcia By Garcia v. Micra, 817 F.2d 650, 657 (10th Cir. 1987) (establishing the "objectively reasonable"
standard embraced by the Oldfield court); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 635.
33. See, e.g., Garcia By Garcia, 817 F.2d at 650.
34. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 531.
35. Id.
36. 2000-NMSC-25 1, 129 N.M. 436-39, 10 P.3d 115, 118.
37. See id. il,129 N.M. at 441, 10 P.3d at 120 (citing Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir.
1980)).
38. See id.
39. See id. (citing Kennedy v. Dexter Consolidated Sch., 124 N.M. 764, 778, 955 P.2d 693, 707 (1998)).
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accept that this distinction marked the outer boundary of the breadth of the clearly
established Fourth Amendment rights in 1992." o
Kennedy epitomizes the concept that inherent in the judicial discretion involved
in a qualified immunity analysis is the high risk of the doctrine's misapplication. If
courts limit the definition of a clearly established right to the precise facts in a
previous case, and do not instead analogize facts before them to facts in precedent
cases, the rules from the cases lose all precedential value. It is rare that a court will
be faced with precisely the same fact pattern time and time again. This rarity and the
concomitant necessity for engaging in analogies is an underlying presumption of
stare decisis. 4"
II.STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Garcia-Montoya v. State of New Mexico State Treasurer's Office,42 an
employee of the State Treasurer's Office, Garcia-Montoya, sued the State Treasurer,
Montoya, alleging several violations of both statutory and constitutional rights.43 In
addition to her allegations of sex discrimination and tort claims," Garcia-Montoya
sued Montoya, his Deputy State Treasurer, Andermann, and the director of the State
Personnel Office, Hooper, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of her constitutional rights to freedom of speech and political association.45
Garcia-Montoya served as the deputy director of administrative services under
former State Treasurer David King. 46 Garcia-Montoya worked on his re-election
campaign, although King was ultimately defeated and replaced by Montoya in the
1994 election. 47 After Montoya took office, Garcia-Montoya served as director of
administrative services. 48
Garcia-Montoya supported her constitutional claims against Montoya by
describing his politically motivated conduct directed toward her. 49 A week prior to
taking office, Montoya requested that Garcia-Montoya call in sick in an effort to
obstruct King's last minute appointments.5" Garcia-Montoya refused. Montoya
subsequently threatened Garcia-Montoya, stating that if she refused to support him,

40. Id. 15, 129N.M. at442, 10P.3dat 121.
41. See generally 28 NY JUR COURTS AND JUDGES § 207:
The doctrine of stare decisis provides that once a court has decided a legal issue, subsequent
appeals presenting similar facts should be decided in conformity with the earlier decision. The
rule of stare decisis is simply an expression of the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and
not disturb settled points. Under the doctrine, precedent is entitled to initial respect, however
wrong it may seem to the present viewer, so long as it results from a reasoned and painstaking
analysis, and a court should not depart from its prior holdings unless impelled by most cogent
reasons.
42. 2001-NMSC-003, - NM_, 16 P.3d 1084.
43. Id. 1, _ N.M. at -, 16 P.3d at 1087.

44. Id. 5, _ N.M. at _, 16 P.3d at 1088. Garcia-Montoya alleged violations of both the New Mexico
Human Rights Act and Tort Claims Act. These causes of action are not the subject of this Note.
16 P.3d at 1087.
45. Id. 5, N.M. at
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. 2,
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. 3,

N.M. at..., 16 P.3d at 1087.

N.M. at

16 P.3d at 1087.
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she would regret his "wrath."'" Most significantly, Montoya told Garcia-Montoya
that he intended to "get his people in."52 Garcia-Montoya believed Montoya' s intent
was the premise for several employment decisions, which Garcia-Montoya believed
were violations of personnel rules.53 Shortly after Garcia-Montoya voiced her
concerns to both Montoya and Andermann, she was transferred from her post to a
"newly-created" position with "less responsibility in a previously nonexistent
division., 54 Not only was Garcia-Montoya supervised by a subordinate as she
packed her personal belongings, but Montoya and Andermann refused to respond
when she questioned them about the transfer.55
In response to Garcia-Montoya' s Section 1983 allegations, Montoya, Andermann,
and Hooper filed Motions for Summary Judgment based on qualified immunity.56
The trial court found all three defendants immune from liability and dismissed
Garcia-Montoya's retaliation claims. 57 Garcia-Montoya appealed the Section 1983
dismissals for the claims against Montoya and Andermann. 8
After meticulously analyzing plaintiffs Section 1983 claims, the New Mexico
Supreme Court determined that there had, indeed, been unequivocal violations of
her constitutional rights.59 Nonetheless, the court affirmed the defendants' immunity
from civil liability, holding that the contours of Garcia-Montoya's constitutional
rights were not sufficiently established at the time of the violations.'
IV. RATIONALE
The court analyzed Garcia-Montoya's First Amendment claims separately,
beginning with the political association piece. As is required by the ElrodlBrantitest
for an exception to political patronage, 6 1 the court analyzed the nature of GarciaMontoya's position by examining her job duties. 6' The test requires a comparison

51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. Id. 4,
N.M. at
16 P.3d at 1087.
56. Id. 6,
N.M. at
16 P.3d at 1088.
57. See id.
58. See id. The claims against Hooper were dismissed based on qualified immunity and Garcia-Montoya
did not appeal from that judgment. Id. 5 n. 1,_ N.M. at _ n._, 16 P.3d at 1089 n. 1.
59. See id. 37, - N.M.at __, 16 P.3d at 1098.
60. Id. 9,
N.M. at ,16 P.3d at 1089.
61. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (defining political patronage as the principle that, contrary
to the First Amendment prohibition, political "party affiliation may be an acceptable requirement for some types
of government employment... if an employee's private political beliefs would interfere with the discharge of his
public duties"). The ElrodlBrantitest is the name for the court's inquiry into whether or not it is acceptable for a
government official to require a subordinate's political alignment with the party in power. Id. While courts once
held that the issue turns on whether an employee holds a policymaking or confidential position, Justice Stevens
articulated that the relevant question is "whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Branti, 445 U.S. at 518
(discussing the doctrine of stare decisis). The Garcia-Montoyamajority explained that this determination necessarily
requires an investigation into the exact nature of the government post at issue. Garcia-Montoya,2001-NMSC-003
13, -_N.M. at -,16 P.3d at 1090. Applying this technique, at least one circuit has found that an employee, who
is "responsible for duties that are measured solely by strictly technical or professional criteria," does not satisfy
Justice Steven's guidelines and, therefore, does not hold the type of post properly subject to a political patronage
requirement. Mendez-Palou v. Rohena-Betancourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1258 (1st Cir. 1987).
62. Garcia-Montoya,2001-NMSC-003 13, __ N.M.at__, 16 P.3d at 1090 (discussing that "[i]n
evaluating
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between a specific employee's responsibilities and those duties that have, in
precedent, subjected an employee's position to political patronage.63 Although it is
well resolved that New Mexico is bound only by Tenth Circuit precedent,' the court
considered ten cases from six other circuits for guidance.65 Notably, the court did
conclude that Garcia-Montoya's right to freely associate had been violated.' The
court further noted, however, that this conclusion resulted from analogy with cases
decided after 1995.67 The court found thatpre-1995case law would not support that
conclusion.' Thus, because Montoya and Andermann acted during 1995,69 the
correlation between Garcia-Montoya's particular circumstances and pre-1995 cases
did not sufficiently support a finding that the defendants had violated "clearly

established" law at the time of the violation.7" The court concluded that the "factual

correspondence" was not close enough and the defendants' confusion about the
constitutionality of plaintiffs transfer was reasonable. Consequently, although
Montoya and Andermann had empirically violated Garcia-Montoya's First
Amendment right to free political association, they were nonetheless immune from
liability.
The court next considered the free speech claim, concluding that qualified
immunity again shielded the defendants from liability for an otherwise clear First
Amendment violation. Garcia-Montoya contended that she had been transferred
because she had voiced concerns that some of Montoya's politically motivated
personnel actions were illegal. 7 As is required by the Pickeringtest for a free speech
violation,72 the court conducted an analysis of "the content, form, and context" of

whether a particular position is subject to employment action, such as a transfer, based on political patronage, we
examine the inherent duties of the position") (citing Sanders v. Montoya, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064 (1999)).
63. Id.
64. Supra note 41.
65. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003 l 13-28, - N.M. at-, 16 P.3d at 1090-94 (citing cases from the
First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits including Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.
1998); Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 1997); Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1999)
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951 (1999); Boyle v. County of Allegheny, 139 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 1998); Peters v. Del. River
Port. Auth., 16 F.3d 1346 (3d Cir. 1994); Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1991);
Feeney v. Shipley, 164 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 1999); Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1989); Milazzo v.
O'Connell, 108 F.3d 129 (7th Cir. 1997); Fazio v. City of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 386, (9th Cir. 1998)).
66. Id. 123, _ N.M.at _, 16 P.3d at 1093.
67. Id. (finding that Garcia-Montoya's job duties did not involve the "authority to establish any policy
decisions concerning personnel, budget or budget allocations, [but instead, involved overseeing] the budget area,
personnel, telecommunications, and information systems." (emphasis added)). Id. "For the most part, Montoya and
Andermann relied on Garcia-Montoya's description of her duties." Id. 117, -_N.M. at __, 16 P.3d at 1091.
[AInd the [undisputed] facts could support Garcia-Montoya's contention that [her position] does
not have meaningful input into the substantive policy decisions for the Treasurer, does not serve
as an important communicator on behalf of the [State Treasurer's Office], and is not privy to
confidential information to such an extent as to require political loyalty.
Id. 23, - N.M. at ., 16 P.3d at 1093.
68. Id. 26,
N.M. at __, 16 P.3d at 1094.
69. Id. 4,- N.M.at _, 16 P.3d at 1087.
70. Id. 13,
N.M. at _, 16P.3d at 1090.
71. Id. 27, _ N.M.at __,16P.3dat!094.
72. Id. 1 28, - N.M. at -, 16 P.3d at 1095. The Pickering balancing test analyzes "whether a public
employer has unconstitutionally abridged an employee's freedom of speech." The four-part test was established in
1968 and considers
(1) whether the speech forming the basis of the employment action involves a matter of public
concern; (2) if so, whether the interests of the employee in speaking on the matter outweigh the
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Garcia-Montoya's words. Just as they had with the political association claim, the
court found the defendants had violated the plaintiff's constitutional right." As with
the political association claim, the court found qualified immunity protected the
defendants from liability.74
Once again, the court held that the absence of sufficiently analogous case law at
the time of trial supported the defendants' confusion. Specifically, the court noted
that in 1995 there existed the following legal presumption: "the determination that
an individual serves in a position subject to political patronage dismissal under
Elrod and Branti renders the Pickeringbalancing test inapplicable to a 1983 claim
based on freedom of speech."7 5 Thus, the annulment of Garcia-Montoya' s political
association claim-as an effect of qualified immunity-automatically invalidated
her free speech claim as well.76
Although the court began with its earlier determination that Garcia-Montoya's
position was not the type for which a government official could require political
loyalty, it also restated that at the time of the trial in 1995 the applicable case law
was less than resolute.77 Therefore, the defendants were protected by qualified
immunity because it was objectively reasonable for them to believe they could
require Garcia-Montoya to be politically affiliated with them. Because of the legal
presumption articulated in Biggs, the court explained that it was also objectively
reasonable for the defendants to believe that Garcia-Montoya's speech reflecting
opposing political views would not be protected. Defendants' reliance on that
particular interpretation of the BrantilElrod and Pickering tests rendered them
immune from liability and Garcia-Montoya could not recover damages.7"
In her dissent, Justice Minzner disagreed that pre-1995 precedent supported the
defendants' immunity. 79 Her critique explained that there are strict limitations on the
instances in which political patronage is required. Citing that it applies only to
"certain high-level employees,""0 Justice Minzner further reasoned that the

interests of the employer in maintaining and promoting efficiency in the performance of its
responsibilities to the public; (3) if so, whether the employee is able to show that the speech was
a substantial factor in the employment decision; and (4) if so, whether the employer is able to
rebut the employee's evidence by showing that it would have instituted the employment action
regardless of the protected speech.
Id. (quoting Martinez v. City of Grants, 122 N.M. 507, 514 (1996)).
73. Garcia-Montoya, 200I-NMSC-003 37, _ N.M. at-., 16 P.3d at 1098 (stating that "viewing the facts
on summary judgment in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, we conclude that the Pickering balance weighs
in favor of Garcia-Montoya").
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 995-96 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, if a court
determines a public employer can require an employee's political loyalty, then a companion free speech claim is
rendered groundless because the employee's "disloyal" speech was improper in the first place. In Garcia-Montoya's
case, she expressed her belief that the defendant's politically motivated personnel decisions were illegal. She was
subsequently dismissed because she was not politically aligned with the defendant. According to the Biggs model,
the dispositive question is whether or not Garcia-Montoya should have been politically aligned with the defendant
employer. If she should have been, or it was reasonable that the defendant believed she should have been, her
companion free speech claim is meaningless because it was spoken out of political disloyalty.
76. Id.
77. Id. 38, - N.M. at - 16 P.3d at 1098-99.
78. Id.
79. Id. 60,
N.M. at-,16P.3datll04.
80. Id.
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exception is narrow and should be resolved in favor of the employee. 8 She also
argued that the majority's "factual correspondence" requirement was too strict.
Quoting Kennedy, Justice Minzner wrote, "relying on Anderson, this court recently
emphasized that we should not require too specific a correlation between the
misconduct and the established law."82 Ultimately, the dissent implied that, at the
very minimum, it should have occurred to the defendants that their actions might
infringe upon Garcia-Montoya's constitutional rights.83
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
In its qualified immunity analysis, the court required too strict a "factual
correspondence" between Garcia-Montoya's circumstances in 1995 and precedent
fact patterns considered before then.' Perhaps this was the effect of the court
employing too formalist an interpretation of Supreme Court guidelines established
in Harlow8 5 and Anderson.86 Harlow instituted the standard of measurement for
constitutional violations by government officials: if the official's conduct is
objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law, he is immune from
liability.87 Presumably, this is because the court is valuing predictability of the law
for government officials. 88 Anderson clarified this standard by holding that "the right
the official is alleged to have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates the right."8'9 This rule increases the likelihood that officials will know the
boundaries for constitutional behavior - thereby, further increasing the predictive
value of the law. Anderson narrowed this rule, nevertheless, by also stipulating that
"this is not to say that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless
the very action in question has previously been held unlawful."9 By ensuring that
government officials do not have automatic immunity every time they act, this
statement establishes a safeguard that precludes the possible development of

81. Id.
82. Id. 56, N.M. at
16 P.d. at 1103.
83. See id.
84. Id. 60,
N.M. at,
16 P.3d at 1104 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
85. 457 U.S. 800.
86. 483 U.S. 635.
87. 457 U.S. 800 (reasoning that
[b]y defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide
no
license to lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and
in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal
reasonableness of an official's acts. Where an official could be expected to know that certain
conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and
a
person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action. But where
an
official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not implicated,
the public interest may be better served by action taken "with independence and without fear
of
consequences").
Id. at 819 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
88. Supra note 41 (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis).
89. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
90. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,528 (1985)).
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unrestricted qualified immunity. It also tends to encourage elected officials to know

the law.
In Kennedy, Justice Franchini reiterated the general rule that "immunity will not
be granted to officials who should have known that their conduct violated the law." 9'
He seemed to embrace the spirit of Harlow and Anderson by also indicating that
"common sense" is required when considering the nexus between conduct involved
in the case at bar and conduct previously deemed unlawful. 92 In Kennedy, the court
applied a "common sense" realist approach when it determined that strip-toundergarments searches were sufficiently analogous to illegal strip-to-nude

searches. 93 Presumably, this was true because the consequences of both practices are

the same-to humiliate and belittle potentially innocent people.94 By likening the
similar circumstances and subsequent impacts, the court evinced its realist approach
to the qualified analysis inquiry.
Just one year later, however, the New Mexico Supreme Court applied a strict
formalist analysis in Garcia-Montoya. Although it could have found there was
sufficient case law to shape the contours of the plaintiffs rights, the court, instead,
found that the defendants were immune from liability. 95 This holding appears to
nullify the court's realist approach in Kennedy. Where the Kennedy court chose to
equate very similar circumstances, Garcia-Montoyais apparently requiring the exact
same set of facts.
In its opinion, the Garcia-Montoyacourt employed the Elrod/Brantitest to assess
whether, in 1995, the defendants violated the plaintiff's political affiliation and free
speech rights.96 The test evolved from several Supreme Court cases decided by
1990. 9' These cases established that unless a government official convinces the court
that an employee must be politically aligned with his party,98 transferring that
employee (against the employee's wishes and without explanation) violates political
association and free speech rights. 99 The test requires an inquiry into the employee's
specific duties and responsibilities, as well as a determination of whether adverse

91. 2000-NMSC-25 10, 129 N.M. at 440, 10 P.3d at 119.
92. Id. (holding that
[t]he same common sense that compels the conclusion that a school official cannot strip a child
naked without having some individualized basis to suspect that child of wrongdoing, also
mandates that a child cannot be stripped to his boxer shorts by officials who have no reason to
suspect him individually)
Id. at 15, 129 N.M. at 442, 10 P.3d at 121.
93. Supra note 37; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (stating, "this is not to say that an official action is
protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful").
94. Kennedy, 2000-NMSC-25 14, 129 N.M. at 441, 10 P.3d at 120 (discussing that "[ilt does not require
a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional
rights of some magnitude") (quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980)).
95. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003 26, -_ N.M. at-, 16 P.3d at 1094.
96. Id 11, __ N.M. at __, 16 P.3d at 1089.
97. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); see also Branti, 445 U.S. 507; Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
98. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 372 (holding that dismissals based on political affiliation "can be fully satisfied
by limiting [them] to policymaking positions"); see also Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 73-74 (holding
that the Elrod rule not only extends to dismissals, but also to transfers; also holding that only "certain high-level
employees" are subject to the exception); but see Elrod, 427 U.S. at 364-68.
99. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see also Elrod,427 U.S. at 356-57; Brand, 445 U.S. at 518; Rutan, 497 U.S.
at 79.
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political affiliation would affect competent performance of the job."° There is an
abundance of case law that defines the boundaries for positions that require political
patronage."'0 Pre-1995 cases support a finding that Montoya and Andermann should
have known their conduct was unconstitutional.0 2 Perhaps the most dispositive rule,
though, may be the pre-1995 Tenth Circuit holding in Dickeson that "close cases
01 3
should be resolved in favor of the public employee."'
Justice Minzner' s dissent appeared to embrace the Dickeson perspective. She, too,
discussed the ElrodlBrantitest and subsequent Supreme Court decisions that defined
the boundaries of the political patronage requirements. In her discussion of
Anderson, however, she instructed that policy considerations underlying both
Section 1983 and the qualified immunity doctrine should be weighed so that "[t]he
level of generality used to define the [plaintiffs] right reflects a balancing of [those]
competing interests."" Justice Minzner's sound argument opposing the majority
opinion asserted that the rules from Elrod, 5 Branti,'06 Rutan,'07and Anderson,108
paired with Circuit decisions Burns v. County of Cambria'09 and Dickeson v.
Quarburg,"' were sufficiently clear enough to pertain to Garcia-Montoya's position
as the deputy administrator of the State Treasurer's Office."' The majority,
nonetheless, rejected this perspective.
Further, the Garcia-Montoya majority appeared to be overly-selective when it
concluded that there was an absence of sufficiently analogous precedent. For
instance, the court cited a 1994 Third Circuit opinion, Petersv. DelawareRiver Port
Authority. 1 2 It relied upon general language that "[p]reparing budgets and
promoting projects are duties which count in favor of finding that the exception to
Branti-Elrod applies... [and] affiliation is unquestionably significant to the.. .duties
of maintaining good public relations and acting as a liaison with public officials."' '"

100. See Elrod, 427 U.S. 347; see also Brand, 445 U.S. 507; Rutan, 497 U.S. 62; Mendez-Palou v. RohenaBetancourt, 813 F.2d 1255 (lst Cir. 1987) (holding that duties involving strictly technical or professional criteria
does not subject the position to political patronage).
101. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 347 (stating that patronage dismissals should be limited to policymaking positions);
Brand, 445 U.S. at 518 (holding that dismissals are constitutional only if "the hiring authority can demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved").
102. Supra note 65.
103. See Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1441-42 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the public employer
"must bear the burden of proof on the issue of whether political affiliation [is] an appropriate requirement for the
effective performance of the public office involved").
104. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003 56, - N.M. at __, 16 P.3d at 1103.
105. 427 U.S. 347.
106. 497 U.S. at 79 (holding that the rule of Brand "extends to promotion, transfer, recall and hiring decisions
based on party affiliation and support...").
107. 497 U.S. 62.
108. 483 U.S. 635.
109. 971 F.2d 1015, 1023 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the political patronage exception is "narrow").
110. 844 F.2d 1435, 1442 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that "doubt should be resolved in favor of the public
employee").
111. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003 IQ53-65, _ N.M. at -- , 16 P.3d at 1103-05 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. 18, - N.M. at -, 16 P.3d at 1091 (citing Peters v. Delaware River Port Authority, 16 F.3d 1346
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that political affiliation for positions involving budget preparation is more logical than it
is for positions involving budget implementation, and that budget preparation, alone, does not render a position
subject to political patronage)).
113. Id.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

The court determined that this case supported the defendants' belief that GarciaMontoya should be politically aligned with them.
As Justice Minzner noted, however, the majority did not address whether a
sufficient and conclusive factual analogy could be drawn between Peters and
Garcia-Montoya."4 The dissent's realist analysis concluded that the circumstances
in the two cases were sufficiently analogous-and the Peters rule sufficiently
clear-such that an official would 5know Garcia-Montoya's was not a position
appropriate for political patronage."1
The dissent's discussion of Peters reveals the majority's restricted examination
of the same. Where the majority cited one of the case's general propositions, it
ignored a significant distinction drawn by the court between policy-making and
policy-implementing job duties. In that case, the Peters court found that the
plaintiff's position was subject to political patronage, because she clearly held a
policy-making position, had extensive involvement in budgetary matters, and was
responsible for some public relations. "6 Garcia-Montoya, however, attested that she
did not have any authority or responsibility for policy decisions "concerning
personnel, budget or budget allocations, for the State Treasurer's Office.""' It was
also undisputed that her involvement with the budget was limited to "basically
seeing the office budget stayed on track,"' " and "paying the bills and filing
personnel matters and adding up the hours for everybody to get them their
paycheck."' The court acknowledged the undisputed ministerial nature of GarciaMontoya's budget involvement, yet rejected the proposition that her position sat in
stark contrast to the high level of budget policymaking required by the 1994 Peters
case. The court appears to have selectively undervalued cases that were the most
unfavorable to the defendants.
Relevant to Garcia-Montoyais Mendez-Palou v. Santos,2 ' a First Circuit case
from 1987-a case relied upon by the plaintiff,'2 ' yet completely disregarded by the
majority. In that case, several government employees were dismissed because of
their political affiliation. One employee held the position of Director of
Administration for the Puerto Rico Environmental Quality Board. Another was the
Assistant Secretary for Special Services in the Department of Agriculture.
The court found that a government position in which the duties are measured
solely by technical or professional criteria is beyond the reach of the patronage
exception. The scope of the duties or position in the governmental hierarchy is

114. Id 62, _ N.M. at _, 16 P.3d at 1105.
115. Id.(drawing a distinction between Garcia-Montoya's budget implementation duty and the budget
preparation duty that the Peters court found subjected the Secretary of the Delaware River Port Authority to
political patronage).
116. 16 F.3d 1346. (finding the position of Secretary of the Delaware River Port Authority was subject to
political patronage where the Secretary was involved in policymaking, interpreting and executing on several
different levels, was responsible for some public relations, and was involved with budget preparation).
15, _ N.M. at , 16 P.3d at 1091. (explaining that both the
117. Garcia-Montoya, 2001-NMSC-003
defendants and the court relied upon Garcia-Montoya's own description of her job duties).
I18. Id.
N.M.at ,16 P.3d at 1092.
119. Id. 20,
120. 813 F.2d 1255 (1stCir. 1987).
121. Brief for Appellant at 16, Garcia-Montoya v. State of New Mexico State Treasurer's Office, 2001NMSC-003, - N.M. -, 16 P.3d 1084 (No. 25,688).
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irrelevant in determining whether the position is subject to political patronage."'
The important consideration is whether the position involves "decisionmaking on
issues where there is room for political disagreements on goals or their
implementation"'23 and "[a]lthough government employees may have differing
views concerning an important technical or operational matter-for instance, the
proper method of accounting to be employed...-such a disagreement... is not the
sort of 'policy' dispute recognized as relevant by Elrod and Brand."'124
The Garcia-Montoyamajority found that plaintiff's position did not afford her
the opportunity to meaningfully participate in policymaking activities.125 Although
the 1987 Mendez-Palou addresses the very same issues considered in the 1995
Garcia-Montoyacase, Garcia-Montoyaheld that Garcia-Montoya's rights were not
clearly established. 26 Perhaps what is most perplexing about the majority's
disregard of Mendez-Palou is the fact that the court itself-while categorically
unbound by non-Tenth Circuit opinions-relied upon ten outside circuit opinions
for guidance, including another First Circuit opinion. 2' Again, the majority
appeared to selectively disregard cases that were most unfavorable to the defendants.
The implications of this decision are clear. The court is employing a formalist
interpretation of the Harlow and Anderson rules. It is also overly-selective in its
consideration of persuasive authority. Unfortunately, it also renders the protections
of Section 1983 inert by requiring such a strict "factual correspondence" between
conduct at issue and conduct previously held unlawful that a plaintiff will almost
never be able to meet his burden. Additionally, this approach does not reflect the
spirit of qualified immunity as a balancing test proposed by Owen, 12 Anderson, 29
and Mendez-Palou. 30 It engenders inattention to the constitution by allowing a
government official to argue that he did not know his conduct was unacceptable
even when it is clear the conduct violates constitutional rights. This perspective
contradicts the essence of the First Amendment protections and undermines the
objectives of Section 1983 as both a remedial provision and a deterrent for future
violations. In sum, the court's methodology in Garcia-Montoyasuggests its bias in
favor of finding qualified immunity-the effect of which both results in an unfairly
heavy burden on plaintiffs to substantiate a constitutional violation claim and
engenders inattention by elected officials to the Constitution itself.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Garcia-Montoya, the New Mexico court espoused an overly-rigid
interpretation of the guidelines for application of qualified immunity set forth by the
Supreme Court. By limiting a plaintiff's ability to prove his case using only
precedential facts almost identical to his own circumstances, the court undermined
122. Mendez-Palou, 813 F.2d at 1258.

123. Id. (quoting Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 803 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1986) (en banc)).
124. Id.
125. Garcia-Montoya,2001-NMSC-003

126. Id.
127. Supra note 65.
128. 445 U.S. 622.
129. 483 U.S. 635.
130. 813 F.2d 1255.

22, _ N.M. at_, 16 P.3d at 1092.
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the important policy goals addressed by Section 1983 remedial provisions. The
court's decision is likely to both inhibit victims of constitutional violations from
seeking redress and promote inattention to constitutional guidelines for governmental conduct in the State of New Mexico. The protection of government officials
from "undue interference with their duties and.. .potentially disabling threats of
liability" is admittedly an important policy goal borne of common law tradition. The
First Amendment, however, is a safeguard of surpassing importance intended to
protect citizens from the evils that have arisen out of the very same tradition.
Hopefully, the court will revisit the discussions from Owen and Anderson and,
consequently, reconsider its position.

